How should a layperson think (or form belief attitudes) about any given statement? Is it enough to research reliable sources and use logical, unbiased thinking? In Chapter 1, I will argue that it is not and that a layperson should instead defer to the majority testimony of experts on that statement, if there are any experts on that statement.

For any statement (or proposition), p, there are three possible belief attitudes (or doxastic attitudes, in technical jargon) toward p: to believe p (which is consistent with having a range of degrees of confidence in p), to disbelieve p (to believe that p is false), and to withhold belief about p (to withhold belief about whether p is true or false).

Doxastic attitudes may not be directly voluntary, but they can be informed by guiding principles that are sufficiently prima facie plausible or evidenced. Consider the following prima facie plausible principle: Unless there are overriding moral objections, one should form epistemically rational doxastic attitudes—that is, doxastic attitudes that best serve one’s epistemic ends, namely those of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs to some respective extent.

Generally, when choosing between different courses of action, with a view to achieving one’s ends, false beliefs are undesirable more so than true beliefs are desirable. One error or miscalculation is often enough to undermine such a decision. Nevertheless, true beliefs are still obviously essential to choosing the best courses of action in pursuit of one’s goals. Therefore, one should aim to maximize one’s subjective chances of holding a favorable ratio of true beliefs to false beliefs (Alston, 1985), rather than the highest absolute number of true beliefs or the lowest absolute number of false beliefs.

It follows that unless there are overriding moral objections, one should acquire epistemically rational doxastic attitudes—that is, doxastic attitudes that maximize one’s subjective chances of holding a favorable ratio of true beliefs to false beliefs.

Now, avoiding fallacies, mitigating one’s cognitive biases, and relying on trustworthy sources of information are the most commonly talked about ways of promoting truth-conducive thinking (or, in other words, acquiring epistemically rational doxastic attitudes). But for any given proposition, unless one is an expert on that proposition, there are ways of thinking about that proposition that are considerably more truth-conducive (or epistemically rational) but rarely if ever discussed outside of specialist academic circles—namely, following the rules of epistemic rationality that govern how laypeople should learn from the testimony of experts.

There are cases of credentialed experts defending fringe claims in reliable sources, such as academic journals, without apparently committing any logical fallacies and without showing any overt signs of bias (Curry, 2011; Lemonick, 2010). This is to be expected in the sciences and in philosophy, where progress often requires that individual scientists and philosophers challenge mainstream or even consensus views.

Laypeople who have learned how to discern logical fallacies, cognitive biases, as well as reputable and disreputable sources of information will be poorly equipped to rationally assess the statements made by those credentialed experts unless and until these laypeople are made acutely aware of the rules of epistemic rationality that govern how they should learn from the testimony of experts—that is, how they should adjust their own doxastic attitudes in light of what doxastic attitudes experts hold.

These rules of epistemic rationality can be summarised as follows: For any proposition, p, a layperson with respect to p is rationally required to believe p if and only if p is believed by the majority of experts on p. There are exceptions to the rule. See Lahno (2014). See also Coady (2012), Goldman (2001), and Huemer (2005). Of course, there is, in principle, nothing stopping a layperson from becoming an expert on p. In that case, there are several alternative belief-forming methodologies available to him or her in the published literature (Matheson, 2015).

Anyone can be an expert on any given proposition, regardless of their academic or professional credentials, provided that they have studied or researched sufficiently thoroughly and impartially the evidence that bears on that proposition (Croce, 2019). The key word here is “sufficiently”. Given the Dunning–Kruger effect (i.e., “difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments”[1]), those who lack the academic or professional credentials of credentialed experts should exercise caution in self-identifying as experts, and others should also exercise caution in identifying them as experts.

In the case of philosophical propositions, and especially ethical and religious propositions, it is arguable whether there are any genuine experts on those propositions (De Cruz, 2018; Frances, 2018; Matheson, McElreath, & Nobis, 2018).

 

Bibliography

Alston, W. (1985). Concepts of epistemic justification. The Monist, 68(1), 57–89. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568116

Coady, D. (2012). What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Croce, M. (2019). On What it Takes to be an Expert. The Philosophical Quarterly, 69(274), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy044

Curry, J. (2011). Reasoning about climate uncertainty. Climatic Change, 108, 723–732. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0180-z

Curtis, G. N. (n.d.). The Fallacy Files. Retrieved April 8, 2021, from http://www.fallacyfiles.org/

De Cruz, H. (2018). Religious Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dowden, B. (n.d.). Fallacies. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 8, 2021, from https://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/

Dunning, D. (2014). We are all confident idiots. Pacific Standard, 7(6), 46–54. https://psmag.com/social-justice/confident-idiots-92793

Frances, B. (2018). Philosophical Expertise. In D. Coady & J. Chase (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy) (pp. 297–306). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315679099

Goldman, A. (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1), 85–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x

Huemer, M. (2005). Is Critical Thinking Epistemically Responsible? Metaphilosophy, 36(4), 522–531. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00388.x

Is My Source Credible? (n.d.). University of Maryland University College. Retrieved April 8, 2021, from https://sites.umuc.edu/library/libhow/credibility.cfm

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121

Lahno, B. (2014). Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 7(2), 54–72. https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167

Lemonick, M. D. (November 1, 2010). Climate heretic: Judith Curry turns on her colleagues. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/news.2010.577

Matheson, J. (2015). Disagreement and Epistemic Peers. Oxford Handbooks Online. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.13

Matheson, J., McElreath, S., & Nobis, N. (2018). Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement. In J. C. Watson & L. K. Guidry-Grimes (Eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics (pp. 87–106). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92759-6_5

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[1] Kruger & Dunning, 1999.

It has always appalled me that really bright scientists almost all work in the most competitive fields, the ones in which they are making the least difference. In other words, if they were hit by a truck, the same discovery would be made by somebody else about 10 minutes later.

—Aubrey de Grey

To make instrumentally rational choices involves choosing courses of action that best serve one’s ends. As a good example, one’s chances of having a positive impact on the world are significantly greater if one focuses one’s efforts on solving the world’s biggest, most urgent problems than if one focuses one’s efforts on solving comparatively small, non-urgent problems that will not ultimately matter in the long run if the biggest, most urgent problems are left unsolved. Therefore, if one’s goal is to make a difference in the world, then it is simply not rational to focus one’s efforts on solving comparatively small, non-urgent problems.

It is true that functioning societies do need people working on comparatively small day-to-day problems. But a shortage of people working on comparatively small day-to-day problems is itself a big urgent problem and so, something that one would need to factor into any rational decision about where to focus one’s efforts.

Moreover, it does not require an exceptionally intelligent person to survey the literature on the various problems that we may be facing and to arrive at a correct assessment of what problems are the biggest and most urgent and what problems are comparatively small and non-urgent. To adopt rational belief attitudes is to adopt belief attitudes (i.e., to believe, to disbelieve or to withhold belief) that best serve one’s epistemic ends, namely those of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. So, provided that one’s methodology for acquiring rational belief attitudes is robust, then there is surely a reasonably approachable threshold of analysis and synthesis beyond which more sophisticated analysis and synthesis will not likely yield a more correct assessment of what problems are the biggest and most urgent and what problems are comparatively small and non-urgent.

We face today an unprecedented number of big urgent problems. With those problems in mind, in this blog, I will supply readers with a robust methodology for acquiring rational belief attitudes and making rational decisions. Readers will then be better equipped to identify and solve the world’s biggest, most pressing problems.

 

Bibliography

 

Gates, B., & Gates, M. (n.d.). Annual Letters From Bill & Melinda Gates. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Retrieved April 8, 2021, from https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Ideas/Annual%20Letters

MacAskill, W. (2015). Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference. New York: Avery. http://www.effectivealtruism.org/doing-good-better

Singer, P. (2010). The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/

Singer, P.(2015). The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically. Yale University Press. Todd, B. J.(2016). 80,000 Hours: Find a fulfilling career that does good. CreateSpace. https://80000hours.org/book/